This is part II of Ed Stacey’s interview with Amy Ertan on AI and military innovation for Strife’s Offensive Cyber Series. You can find part I here.
ES: I feel like there is a whole interview to be had on this idea of an AI arms race, especially with some of the signals from governments about the importance of these technologies.
AE: We talk about an AI arms race, but actually the number of countries that have the resources to invest in this is really small. The US, of course, is investing billions and billions, and they have their Joint Artificial Intelligence Center which is coordinating AI, including AI for use in cyberspace. The UK invests a huge amount as well and so do a few other states within Europe, for example France. But for the majority of states, say across NATO, AI in conflict is not something that is currently top of the agenda: it is something that is discussed at the strategic level and people know that it will hit and have impact in 20 to 30 years’ time. So we are seeing that strategic discussion but it costs so much that it is just a matter of states buying solutions from the private sector, so lots of questions there to.
ES: On that note, given the private sector is so important in the development of AI, do you think that the advantage lies with liberal democratic states and their innovate, free-market economies or authoritarian states that have greater control over private companies, enhancing military-civil fusion? Or alternatively, is that dichotomy a bit of a cliché?
AE: That dichotomy is a bit of a cliché. I will say, though, that the states that do have control and oversight over their industry, China for example, have a significant advantage when it comes to military-civil fusion and access to big data. China places either top or joint top with the US at the moment – I think there is a separate computing race – when it comes to AI. And when you look at conversations, in the US and UK for example, public-private partnerships are a major focus with AI because you need to partner with companies like Microsoft, IBM, Amazon and Google.
The free-market economy is not something I think has an inherent advantage, which sounds strange to say. But there is an interesting aspect in that for a lot of private sector leaders in AI, governments are not their main target market – they do not need to work for them. There is controversy around what they do, for example with Google and Project Maven.
There has been a shift in the way that military innovation takes place over the last half-century or so and the government now has less control over who works with them than before. So public-private partnership is something that states like the UK and US would love to improve on. There are also challenges for government procurement cycles when it comes to technologies like AI because you need a much faster procurement cycle than you do for a tank or a plane. So working with the private sector is going to become increasingly central to Ministry of Defence procurement strategies moving forward.
ES: Your PhD research explores the unforeseen and unintended security consequences of developing and implementing military AI. Could you speak a little to how these consequences might materialise in or through the cyber domain?
AE: There are two aspects to this: one is the technical security angle and then the second is the strategic security angle. In terms of cyber security aspects, first, you have the threat that your AI system itself may not be acting as intended. Now especially when we think about sophisticated machine learning techniques, you often cannot analyse the results because the algorithm is simply too complicated. For example, if you have developed deep learning or a neural network, there will potentially be hundreds of thousands of nodes and no “explainability” – you have a “black box” problem as to what the algorithm is doing. That can make it very difficult to detect when something goes wrong and we have seen examples of that in the civic space, where it has turned out many years after the fact that an algorithm has been racist or sexist. It is a slightly different challenge in the military sphere: it is not so much about bias but rather is it picking up the right thing? Obviously, within a conflict environment you do not want to detect a threat where there is not one or miss something.
Second, there is the threat that your algorithm or data may be compromised and you would not know. So this could be the input data that you are feeding in or the system itself. For example, you may have a cyber defence algorithm that picks up abnormal activity on your network. A sophisticated attacker could interfere with the programming of that algorithm or tamper with the data so that the algorithm thinks that the attacker has been there all along and, therefore, that it is not abnormal activity and no flags are raised. So the way in which threat modelling does not consider the creativity of attackers, or insufficiency of the algorithm, could lead to something being deployed that is not fit for purpose.
Third, adversarial AI. This is the use of techniques to subvert an AI system, again making something that is deployed fallible. For one perhaps theoretical but technically feasible example, you could deploy an algorithm in cyberspace that would only target certain kinds of infrastructure. Maybe you would want it to not target hospitals, but that could be gamed – everyone could attempt to make their site look like a hospital to the algorithm.
Right now, the technology is too immature and we do not have direct explainability. It is also very difficult to know the right level of confidence to have before deploying an AI system and there are questions around oversight. So while technical challenges around explainability and accuracy may be solved through strict verification and validation procedures that will mature in time with AI capabilities, some of these unintended consequences come down to human factors like trust, oversight and responsibility. For example, how do humans know when to override an AI system
Those societal and policy questions will be tricky and that is what leads you into the strategic debate. For example, what is the appropriate use of AI in an offensive manner through or beyond cyberspace? What is a legitimate target? When it comes to AI and offensive cyber, all of the main questions around offensive cyber remain the same – the ones that traditionally apply to cyber conflict and the ones that we want to start thinking about with sub-threshold conflict. With AI, I think it is the way in which it can be mis-utilised or utilised to scale up inappropriate or unethical activity that is particularly problematic.
ES: How should states go about mitigating those risks? You touched on norms earlier, but because a lot of this work is super secretive, how can we have those conversations or develop regulation when states are, perhaps for good reason, not willing to reveal what they are doing in this space?
AE: Absolutely. Military innovation around AI will always be incredibly secretive. You will have these propriety algorithms that external parties cannot trust, and this is really difficult in the military space where the data is so limited anyway. I mentioned earlier that you can feed three million pictures of cats into an algorithm that then learns to recognise a cat, but there are way fewer images of tanks in the Baltic region or particular kinds of weapon. The data is much more limited in secretive military contexts and it potentially is not being shared between nations to the extent that might be desirable when it comes to building up a better data set that would lead to more accurate decisions. So encouraging information sharing to develop more robust algorithms would be one thing that could mitigate those technical risks.
Talking about broader conversations, norms and regulations. I think regulation is difficult. We have seen that with associated technologies: regulation moves quite slowly and will potentially fail to capture what happens in 10, 15 or 20 years’ time because we cannot foresee the way in which this technology will be deployed. Norms, yes, there is potential there. You can encourage principles, not only in the kinetic space but there are also statements and agreements around cyberspace – NATO’s Cyber Defence Pledge, for example, and the Paris Call. States can come together and agree on baseline behaviours of how to act. It is always difficult to get consensus and it is slow, but once you have it that can be quite a powerful assurance – not confirmation that AI will not be used in offensive cyber in undesirable ways, but it gives some assurance to alliance structures.
And those kinds of conversations can prove the basis for coming together to innovate as well. So we already see, for example, while the UK and US have the power and resources to invest themselves, across NATO groups of countries are coming together to look at certain problems, for example to procure items together, which may well be the path towards military AI.
It is difficult and you cannot force states to cooperate in this way, but it is also in the interests of some states. For example, if the US has invested billions in military AI for cyber purposes, it is also in its interest that its allies are secure as well and that the wider ecosystem is secure. So it may choose to share some of those capabilities to allies, not the most secretive nor the raw data but, for example, the principles to which it abides by or certain open source tools. Then we start thinking about trust networks, whether that is the Five Eyes, NATO or other alliance structures too. So it is not hopeless.
The final interview in Strife’s Offensive Cyber Series is with Dr Jacquelyn Schneider on cyber strategy. It will be released in two parts on Thursday 24th and Friday 25th June 2021.
The post Offensive Cyber Series: Amy Ertan on AI and Military Innovation, Part II appeared first on Strife.